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Introduction 
In 2011 Apple’s Irish subsidiary had a profit of 16 billion Euros but only 50 million of them 
were charged as tax in Ireland. Apple ended up paying a tax rate of only 0.005% in 2014 on 
the profits of its Irish subsidiary down from an anyway low 1% in 20031. This is but one 
example of so-called “jurisdiction arbitrage” by which large companies avoid or evade 
liabilities.2 It is now estimated that total tax losses amount to $400 billion for OECD 
members alone3 and to a global revenue loss of around $650 billion4. Company law provides 
the multinationals with the legal tools which enable tax avoidance. MNEs, which are a series 
of inter-linked companies formed in various national legal systems, incorporate subsidiaries 
in jurisdictions which provide them with legal yet unethical tax loopholes. Basic company 
law principles such as the principle of separate legal personality and limited liability have 
evolved into a veil which protects multinationals from external control on their tax affairs at 
multiple levels. Each member of the group is deemed as of independent from each other in 
most instances. Yet, taxing its profits within the jurisdiction where they were actually 
produced could prove impossible. Despite the recognition of each member of the group as a 
separate legal entity, company law allows the members of the same group to transfer 
intellectual property and licensing rights within the group and to therefore shift their tax base 
to whichever jurisdiction offers a more attractive set of tax rules. When unrelated companies 
transact with each other the costs and prices of their financial exchange are driven and fixed 
by the market. The article argues that this is not the case with multinationals and their intra-
group exchanges. When members of the same group transact then the price of the transaction 
may not be fixed by the free market but by the need to minimise the groups’ costs and tax 
liability. That leads to a lawful tax avoidance which renders a reform of company law 
ethically imperative and necessary from a legal and economic point of view. Therefore, our 
thesis is that tax avoidance at the level of multi-national groups in the EU is now 
institutionalised. The article argues for a reform of company law to address the 
instutitionalisation of corporate tax avoidance.  
To that end it is argued that the principles of separate legal personality and limited liability in 
their current form are unfit for corporate groups when issues of taxation are at stake.  They 
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should be significantly reformed, so that each member of the group is viewed as established 
in the member state where it operates with its revenues shielded and -most importantly- taxed 
in that jurisdiction. When this proves to be too difficult or complicated, the corporate veil 
should be lifted altogether and the mother company of the group should be taxed for the 
entire set of profits made by all the members of the group in the EU. 
The article is structured as follows.  It will examine the purposes of tax, arguing that the 
social compact between a government and the population is enhanced by taxes. The article 
will explain the nature and functions of corporate groups. It will look at the concept of 
jurisdictional arbitrage; namely at the ways in which the cross-national structure of corporate 
groups can be used in order to avoid taxation in multiple jurisdictions with a special focus on 
the European Union and its member states. The article will explain the history, structures and 
complex multi-layered and multi-jurisdictional mechanics of corporate tax avoidance, which 
flow from the failings of company law. It will then argue for a review of the application of 
the principles of limited liability and of separate legal personality at the group level for tax 
purposes.  It will explain how intellectual property emerged as a basic tool for tax avoidance 
within the context of a group.  Company law provides groups with a set of lawful tools to 
escape taxation in all jurisdictions where the multinationals are physically present and fully 
operational. This is particularly evident in the three case-studies that the article focuses upon. 
The Starbucks, Google and Apple groups availed themselves of the full set of tools provided 
to them by company law. They structured their group and operations in such a way so that 
their profits were transferred not just to the jurisdiction where the tax rates were the lowest in 
the EU, but also to the jurisdictions which provided them with tax loopholes. The latter 
allowed them not only to escape the low rates in question but, to pay only a fraction of them. 
These tactics are unethical yet lawful on the basis of the current company law framework. 
The article concludes that the law should change so that groups and their individual members 
pay the appropriate amount of tax as set by the jurisdictions where they operate.    
 
The Purpose of Tax 
“The whole history of tax, government and democracy is entangled precisely because those 
who have been taxed have demanded that their consent to taxation be sought before any such 
charge was imposed.”5 Murphy’s point is that even if the population is disenchanted with 
their politicians, they have the right to vote, and governments can be unseated. A new 
administration might change the tax laws as the people do have the right to vote in elections 
that result in the formation of the governments that set the taxes in the countries which they 
reside. However, the definitions of ‘tax and taxes’ are decided by the prevailing economic 
climate where individuals are ‘burdened’ by governmental levies.  According to the Oxford 
dictionary ‘tax or taxes’ are “a compulsory contribution to state revenue, levied by the 
government on workers’ income and business profits, or added to the cost of some goods, 
services and transactions.”6 Contrast this definition to The Encarta definition; “Money paid to 
a government, an amount of money levied by a government on its citizens and used to run the 
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government and the country or state”7 The Oxford dictionary’s definition focuses on 
compulsion and there is no reason given for the purpose of levying the money. A legal 
dictionary defines tax as ‘a governmental assessment (charge) upon property value. . . simply 
counting the possible means of taxing property, an arid technical definition.8 On the other 
hand, the Encarta dictionary’s definition hints at the reasons and it also suggests that the 
‘money is paid’ by taxpayers without compulsion. Without going deeply into what is 
‘compulsion’; it is interesting that in the Word Thesaurus ‘compulsion’ is synonymous as 
‘pressure’ or ‘obligation’.’ Murphy argues that in a democratic state with a full franchise, the 
money paid by the taxpayers is optional since all people have debated the taxes and the law 
has been set democratically. Compulsion is hard to suggest in this case.”9 ‘Pressure’ and 
‘obligation’ could be better words because the tax is levied by consent. The crucial point is: 
“How can sovereign citizens democratically decide how much of their resources they wish to 
devote to common goals”10 
 Here we can only highlight crucial aspects of the struggle between States, governments and 
the people. It is well known that the prevailing economic model in the Anglo-American 
sphere11 is the neo-liberal paradigm. The recent history of neo-liberalism is to be found in the 
scholarship propounded by the Austrian economist and social philosopher, Ludwig Von 
hurdles and Friedrich Von Hayek.12 Von Mises’s axiom that ‘egoism is the basic law of 
society’13 led him to conclude that unrestricted laissez-faire, free markets and governments 
that are confined to the defence of unhampered private property rights comprised the only 
viable policy for the human race.14 The neo-classicist doctrine is that rational actors will, if 
left undirected, make maximally efficient economic decisions which will maximise their 
welfare, leading to an efficient economy where all will eventually benefit: “For more than 20 
years economists were enthralled by so-called “rational expectations””15. One of the tenets of 
neo-liberalism is that economic growth will deliver benefits to all16. Faithful adherents in this 
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model are acting on the theory and many believe it is the dominant economic paradigm for 
the world. The debates between the neo-liberal vision and a welfare economy are very 
intense. This is particularly true in a democratic State where there is an understanding that 
there is a social compact between the government and the people. Issues of tax involve 
power, democracy and inequality because all of them are involved in struggle to evolve a 
society as Piketty has shown17.  Richard Murphy’s book is apposite; the book is entitled ‘The 
Joy of Tax’18 because if we need to design a just society you need a legal framework which 
includes a redistribution mechanism between the advantaged and the less prosperous citizens. 
Some believe that this can found in ‘the Rule of Law’ a vague concept where laws are 
promulgated, predicated on a loose understanding of niceness, human rights and liberal 
values.19 These values are important but the power struggle to design a society is based on a 
constant fluctuation   between actors involving moral values, selfishness and pragmatism.20 In 
this struggle taxes are right in the frame. Legal discourse on ownership rights and property 
rights are vital. They are crucial because there is a constant tension between the extent of 
protection for property rights and what sort of property rights should be valued. In the tax 
arena, the discourse is shrill. Many neo-liberal commentators, especially the Libertarian 
Alliance, argue that all tax is theft because in a free market all services can be purchased and 
government should have no say on pre-tax income. They argue that it is a fiction that the 
government provides services because they are in the public interest.21 To challenge this point 
of view Murphy and Nagel have a written a scholarly thesis arguing that taxes are the most 
significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of 
economic justice and showing that the fairness of the distribution of pre-tax income is a red 
herring and a misconception of property rights. The property right of pre-tax income lies in 
the government and taxes should be understood as a democratic levy for society.22 In this, 
Richard Murphy concurs where he argues that taxes are optional.23  Pope Francis also argues 
against the neo-liberal ideology and he propagated ‘Evangelii Gaudium’’ (The Joy of the 
Gospel) in 2013. Here he argues that free market will certainly not benefit everyone.  He 
argued that a simplistic neo-liberal economic model shows “a crude and naïve trust in the 
goodness of those wielding economic power in the sacralised working of the prevailing 
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economic system . . .” in the meantime the disadvantaged are left destitute.24   Harvey Cox 
argues that “At the time of writing, markets have assumed mythological proportions.25 The 
consequences of the neo-liberal system is are dire for the populations of these countries’26 
such as the denigration of the environment27 and increasing inequality which may lead to the 
hollowing out of national states and of democracy. Thomas Picketty’s seminal book Capital, 
shows that in Anglo-Saxon countries the share of the top 0,1% cent highest incomes in total 
income rose sharply since the 1970 countries28. He also argues that taxation is not a technical 
matter rather it is a political issue.29. Where countries had huge inequality, frequently it 
fuelled revolutions because the society lost a purpose; “without taxes, society has no common 
destiny”30. Picketty argues that French revolution and the revolt of the British colonies were a 
fiscal upheaval. “No taxation without representation”31. The neo-liberal regime provides a 
“universally valid and application ‘policy mix’ and is propagated accordingly. This means 
that political reforms should be oriented towards economic objectives – low inflation, a 
balanced budget, the removal of trade barriers and foreign currency controls, maximum 
mobility for capital minimum regulation of the labour market ... these are the reform 
objectives of the neo-liberal regime...it is supposed to be apolitical but of course it is highly 
political”32 
Less tax is one of the neo-liberal tenets because of the thrust of individualism and this itself 
leads a wish to slim governments and welfare. The opposite philosophy argues that less 
advantaged people need governmental services and the government needs to raise revenue to 
allow a welfare state to thrive. Furthermore, industry needs good infrastructure to promote 
business. The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that “the nation’s highways and 
bridges face an $808.2 billion backlog of investment spending”33 ”34. Why is all of this 
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important? In a neo-liberal35 economy the discourse is to suggest that an individual has 
absolute property rights including money and all assets. This is particularly important in the 
corporate arena. Legally a corporation is a person, but the prevailing discourse is that its 
objective is profit maximisation. In this context, the company’s directors have a duty to avoid 
tax as their property rights are sacred and absolute. This means that common goals like health 
and education are denigrated and profit maximisation is promoted. 
Although it is impossible to delve into all of the economic philosophies around property 
rights in this article we will focus on the role of tax avoidance by MNEs and damage done by 
the lost tax revenue to the governments.36 Margaret Hodge, chair of the public accounts 
committee, told Google's northern Europe boss, Matt Brittin, that “his company's behaviour 
on tax was "devious, calculated and, in my view, unethical"37. Although the tax avoidance 
schemes were legal it is clear that government services are hit if the biggest companies do not 
pay tax. There is abundant research to show that the poor need public services more than the 
rich.38 
Groups of Companies and Jurisdictional Arbitrage 
The “company” as a legal and social phenomenon has not only been one of the successful 
human inventions but it has been one of the pillars of the modern economy and at the end 
society. This is due to its attributes of legal personality and limited liability. These are legal 
principles which were granted by the state to the company rendering the latter the vehicle 
through which investment is channelled. Legal personality entails the recognition of the 
company as nearly equivalent to a natural person39. The principle has been a “foundation 
stone”40 in the development of company law.  The company therefore, exists independent of 
its founders as well as its members and it can sign contracts, sue and be sued and own assets 
on its own. Incorporating a business aims at ensuring that is members will not incur personal 
liability41. The creation of a legal fiction which amounted to a legal entity, which was 
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separate from the humans behind it, was substantial for recognising responsibility for harmful 
actions or, in legal terms, “liability”42. From the introduction of a separate legal personality 
and onwards the management of the company and its shareholders were no longer going to be 
held accountable for wrongs perpetrated by them; the liability was to be shouldered by the 
legal person that is the company. At the level of an individual company this may be quite 
helpful to the claimant taking into account that it is easier to sue a company for wrongs 
perpetrated by it, rather than attempting to identify the humans behind it, which may demand 
sufficient time, and resources that the claimant may not possess. Therefore, the granting of a 
separate legal personality to the company has enhanced legal clarity as liability can be 
attributed to the individual legal person rather than a variety or a network of natural persons 
who are behind it and are difficult to identify.   
At the level of a corporate group however, as it is going to be explained later in this article, 
the principle in question creates an additional layer of protection to the parent company 
shielding it further against unlawful or harmful acts perpetrated by its subsidiary. All of the 
companies in the group are separate, therefore it is difficult to sue a company because the 
damage may we caused by one or more of the companies in the group. All of the companies 
are separate legal entities responsible for their own actions; and therefore importantly 
shielded against liability for the actions of other members of the group. Where one or more 
company are incorporated in different jurisdictions the protection afforded increases because 
there may be procedural hurdles for claimants (including forum non conveniens43), 
differences between company laws in the jurisdictions and sometimes lax regulations in 
diverse jurisdictions. These differences are seized by the MNEs to protect them and allow 
them to minimise their tax liability. In the Adams44 case the court stated that it is within the 
rights of the company to structure its group in such a way so that all liabilities fall on one of 
the members of the group. That effectively shields the rest of the members and primarily the 
parent from any liability against claims even though they were quite likely masterminded by 
it. This seems to constitute a distortive application of one of the most fundamental principles 
of company law, which is undoubtedly of critical importance for our entire legal system. 
Company law recognises subsidiaries as a useful tool to establish domestic corporate 
residence or citizenship for doing business and to limit the extent of the liability of the parent 
but the law has overreached this principle45.  
The granting of limited liability to the company was a critical moment in history. Limited 
liability establishes that the individuals behind the company are only liable to the extent of 
their investment to the company. Limited liability effectively removed the risk inherent in 
corporate activities and paved the way for millions of people to engage themselves in 
corporate investments. In case of insolvency46 their liability will be limited to their 
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contribution to the company’s assets. In no way can it be extended to their personal assets. 
Therefore, limited liability effectively allows the shareholder eager to invest into a company 
to pre-determine the maximum level of his liability and losses in case of insolvency. It 
created a safety net which allows investors to provide their capital to the company without 
the threat of losing more than their pre-calculated acceptable loss in case of insolvency. 
Limited liability was viewed as the “greatest single discovery of our times...even steam and 
electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation and they would be 
reduced to comparative impotence without it”47. The rationale behind this quite strong 
statement is the importance ascribed to the principle of limited liability for spurring the 
investment which was necessary to fuel the industrial revolution. As the industrial revolution 
was taking pace, it brought along rapid and radical changes to all aspects of economic life. It 
became evident that if England was to fully profit from the technological advances taking 
place in its territory it had to put in place corporate structures that would facilitate large scale 
investment. Admittedly, the existence of unlimited liability that rendered private investment 
in companies and ongoing industrial projects a decision of high risk was perceived as the 
main obstacle to the realisation of the enormous potential of the new economy. The doctrine 
came into existence roughly at the same time as the industrial revolution was gathering pace.  
Groups of Companies: history, structures, invisibility, purpose and challenges. 
The two principles which form the core of company law are clear in their application when it 
comes to a single corporate entity, but they can acquire a certain degree of controversy when 
they apply in a group of companies. The growth of MNEs has been possible precisely 
because most legal systems regard one company holding shares in another in exactly the 
same way as if the company were a human individual shareholder.  Most legal systems take 
no account of the reality of the accumulation of power represented by a large number of 
companies related by interlocking shareholdings, despite the fact that many companies are 
organised in a ‘group’ structure wherein control is exercised over a number of subsidiaries 
through shares held by a ‘parent’ company. While the simplest case is a hierarchy with 100 
per cent shareholding by a parent company, there are numerous other ways of creating 
effective control of one company over others through a range of share structures and other 
contractual devices such as franchises and joint ventures.48 
From a legal point of view “each individual is a juridical entity with his own rights and 
duties”49. The principle of limited liability covered initially only the shareholders who were 
natural persons as a company could not become a shareholder in another company50. It 
facilitated investment as it ensured private individuals that their private property could not be 
seized by creditors in case of corporate insolvency. In fact, in the nineteenth century in the 
UK if the memorandum of association was silent, it was ultra vires for a company to purchase 
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shares of another company51. This meant that unless the –then- constitution of the company 
specifically allowed a company to buy shares of another company, the former could not do 
that. And if it did, the action would have been found invalid as an ultra vires act, which means 
an act which falls outside of the objects of the company. The UK Company’s Act 1862 did 
not contain any explicit prohibition of inter-company shareholding52 but, apparently the 
approach towards this issue was cautious. In the USA until the end of the nineteenth century a 
company could not acquire shares in another company save the cases where this was 
explicitly authorised by statute53. In the US this changed in 1890s when the state of New 
Jersey introduced new legislation54 which allowed a company to form a subsidiary and to own 
its shares55. 
So, it is fair to argue that limited liability for corporate groups “emerged from a historical 
accident”56. After companies were allowed to become shareholders of other companies, the 
doctrine of limited liability began applying to parent corporations, as shareholders, for acts of 
their subsidiaries57. Within a group the doctrine of limited liability limits the liability of both 
the parent company –for the actions of its subsidiaries- as well as of individual shareholders. 
That creates a multi-layer protection for the parent company which dissociates itself from any 
harmful actions perpetrated by subsidiaries linked to it unless they are functionally the same 
entity58.  
At the early stages of corporate formation, the groups of companies consisted mostly of 
companies within the same jurisdiction. However, nowadays this is certainly not the case. 
Nowadays, the members of the group are present in multiple countries. Therefore, the main 
problem now is the extraterritoriality of national jurisdiction. Let us examine this a little more 
closely. Each nation-state has equal sovereign power to regulate its territory and to enact its 
own laws. Companies are a legal fiction invented by national law. Each state possesses the 
power (and usually the exclusive power) to regulate the company and to enforce its liabilities. 
It is important to note that a group of companies as a whole does not have legal personality59. 
It is not a single legal entity. MNEs are, rather, complex structures made up of individual 
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companies in a variety of interrelationships. While globalization means that the world 
appears to be a smaller place and while goods and people can move freely across borders, 
companies remain legally tied to the country where they are formed. The operation of equal 
sovereign power, moreover, normally means that regulations made in one jurisdiction, in the 
normal course of events, cannot have any impact on corporate liability in another. This is the 
problem of extraterritoriality. The fact that MNEs are series of companies formed in different 
national legal systems and tied together in various legal ways, either by holding shares in 
each other or by various legally binding agreements between them presents genuine 
complexity. The latter renders taxing MNEs quite difficult.  
Therefore, the main motives for opening a subsidiary in another jurisdiction are the desire to 
escape “the difficulty – if not the impossibility- of qualifying the parent company as a foreign 
corporation in a particular state...the avoidance of taxation...the desire for limited liability”60. 
A primary purpose for this parent-subsidiary organisational structure is to minimise the 
potential liability of the parent company61 for the operation and potential claims against its 
subsidiaries62. A corporate group can be defined as two or more companies that operate 
“under a similar directive to achieve a common objective”63. Groups are complex structures 
made up of individual companies in a variety of interrelationships64. Given the complexity of 
the links between the members of the group it is difficult to provide a uniform definition of 
the term “group”65. A crucial element is the element of control that one member exerts over 
the other that determines whether the companies are “affiliated”, “associated” or we are 
talking about a “collective conduct of the integrated business”66. Vertical groups comprise a 
parent and its subsidiaries, while horizontal groups comprise of companies with cross-
holdings or pyramidal structures67. Within the group each company enjoys the privileges of 
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limited liability and of the independence guaranteed by the separate legal personality. Despite 
the fact that the group companies share a “unity of purpose”68 and “commonality of 
design”69, the members of the group are independent entities. Each of the members of the 
group is subject to the jurisdiction of the country where it is established. Therefore, although 
the members of the group may follow the same strategy and pursue the same agenda, they are 
independent of each other and subject to a different set of laws depending on the jurisdiction 
and the country of establishment. The companies are “creatures of national legal systems 
since they are incorporated in certain jurisdictions”70. The term “multi-national enterprises” 
stems from the recognition of the fact that the group consists of members operating in an 
array of different countries71. Hence, they are subject to different jurisdictions which entail a 
set of legal obligations and standards that need to be adhered to, which may vary significantly 
from country to country. The operation of equal sovereign power, moreover, normally means 
that regulations made in one jurisdiction, in the normal course of events, cannot have any 
impact on corporate liability in another. The combination of separate legal personality and 
limited liability rendered the creation of a subsidiary an attractive choice. It enables its parent 
company to enter another jurisdiction, unfold its business activities while shielded from 
liability. It insulates an area of investment and a set of assets from pressures from either 
creditors or the judiciary as the liability will fall on the subsidiary rather than the controlling 
parent. Limited liability was created to protect private investment into companies. However, 
at group level there is a shifting of risk from the parent company and its shareholders to the 
creditors of a subsidiary72. This is because the parent is protected by two levels of limited 
liability; one that shelters the parent company against liability of the subsidiary and a second 
one which shelters the parent’s shareholders from any claim against them. 
 
Limited Liability and Separate Legal Personality should not apply to groups for tax 
purposes.  
Problems started to emerge when the traditional company law concepts of limited liability and 
separate legal personality applied at the group level. Legal personality and limited liability as 
well as company law in general took shape at a time when “business enterprises were 
organised and conducted through a single independent corporation”73. The role of a natural 
person as a shareholder differs from that of a company as a shareholder. The former is usually 
apathetic and unaware of corporate developments which can lead to insolvency and therefore 
                                                          
68
 Shwetank Ginodia, Rishi Shroff, A Corporate Governance Perspective on Lifting the Veil in Group 
Companies in India and the United Kingdom, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 423, 
(2014). 
69
 Philip Blumberg , The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of Corporate Groups, 37(1) 
Connecticut Law Review, 606, (2005). 
70
 Muzzafer Eroglu, Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities, An Interdisciplinary and Comparative 
Examination, 70, (London: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
71
 Karen Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Kluwer Law International, 5, (The Netherlands, 2007). 
72
 Muzzafer Eroglu, Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities, An Interdisciplinary and Comparative 
Examination, 72, (London: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
73
 Karen Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Kluwer Law International, 5, (The Netherlands, 2007). 
12 
 
12 
 
in need of protection covering his personal assets. In such a context limited liability reduces 
transaction and monitoring costs74. It reduces the need for shareholders to monitor 
managers75. That has been viewed as enhancing efficiency76. However, when those concepts 
apply to the “complex corporate structure of the large multinational enterprise, they break 
down”77.  
Nowadays, within the group context limited liability that insulates parent corporations from 
“liability for the claims of involuntary creditors of the controlled corporation causes even 
economists to...concede that limited liability raises serious problems because it enables the 
enterprise to externalize its costs”78. Limited liability now enables a corporate group which is 
structured in tiers of companies to insulate each corporate tier of the group, and thus, achieve 
“layers of insulation for the parent corporation from liability for the obligations of its 
numerous subsidiaries”79. Shareholder protection is not even an issue at this stage. Even if a 
parent company is not shielded against the liabilities of its subsidiaries, the shareholders of the 
parent will still be protected as they are covered at individual level by limited liability80. 
Hence, the liability for the subsidiaries’ harmful action will not be shouldered by them but by 
the legal person that is the parent company. 
Thus, while at the level of an individual company the necessity of limited liability is almost 
self-evident, the case for disregarding the corporate entity is more compelling when the 
shareholder itself is another corporate entity81. Granting limited liability to individual 
investors may encourage “investment in productive albeit risky activities”82. However, its 
extension to parent companies is inappropriate because they “manifestly constituted an 
important part of the enterprise”83. The majority of private individuals acquiring shares of 
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either a private or a public company do not possess the assets and capital that a company has 
when it sets up a network of subsidiaries. In the case of the latter, the company possesses 
sufficient capital and financial and legal expertise to set up a network of inter-connected 
companies in a variety of jurisdictions. The parent company will not act as a passive investor 
or as a “normal shareholder”84who is in need of protection. It will actively engage in the 
management of the subsidiary. For this reason there are no information and monitoring costs 
either. In this case the principle of limited liability is actually twisted in making sure that the 
parent is to be safeguarded against any legal claims against the subsidiary when the latter is 
involved in illegal or sometimes criminal activities. Therefore, what was designed as an 
incredibly important legal tool which protected the rights of individuals, evolved into a 
mechanism which shields a parent company against liability for illegal activities perpetrated 
by its subsidiary in an anyway quite complex web of inter-related companies. In such a case 
the parent company’s liability will be limited to the extent of its shareholding in the 
subsidiary. However, parents will arrange their legal and financial affairs in such a way so as 
to minimise involvement of that type in subsidiaries.  
This enables an era of “organisational decoupling” primarily achieved through the so-called 
subsidiarisation85. Subsidiarisation is a term which is employed when it is to define the 
channelling of corporate activities through different legal entities86to avoid risk. 
Subsidiarisation on the basis of the Adams case87has become a part of a business strategy to 
“insulate one card in the house of corporatisation from the collapse of another card”88. The 
organisational structure of the group can be shaped so as to shift liability exclusively in one 
member of a group, which is established in the jurisdiction with the less restrictive legislative 
framework. As the final part of the article will argue, it can also be shaped in a manner which 
can attain significant tax avoidance for the group using a web of intra-company loans, transfer 
agreements, intellectual property and other undoubtedly legal tools which can relieve the 
parent from many regulatory or tax burdens. This “organisational decoupling”89or “liability 
outsourcing”90aims at breaking down the central business into a variety of legal entities 
operating in different jurisdictions so that the parent escapes liability. This means that a parent 
can outsource liability-prone activities to the subsidiary. The parent can simply lead its 
subsidiary to legal demise by ordering its liquidation and the potential transfer of its assets to 
the parent or to another member of the group. This means that the subsidiary will cease to 
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exist from a legal point of view which entails the loss of any liability in the first place. In the 
best case scenario the litigators are left with the herculean task to detect any sufficient 
business or administrative link between the subsidiary and the parent which will result in the 
liability attached to the latter. But, the group will have positioned and structured itself in such 
a way that such links would be almost impossible to prove. The most distinctive feature of 
multinational corporate groups is their incredible complexity91. Therefore, tracing liability 
within the context of a corporate group92is viewed as one “of the great unsolved problems of 
modern company law and probably the most controversial problem of group law”93. And this 
is why piercing the veil or otherwise establishing a legal link between the parent and the 
subsidiary so that the former will be found liable for the harmful acts of the latter is the “most 
litigated issues in corporate law”94. 
 
Countering MNE’s arbitrage 
The simple way to counter the protection afforded to MNEs via the doctrine of separation 
between companies is to lift the corporate veil. The lifting or piercing of the corporate entails 
that the two companies are not to be viewed as independent legal entities but as a single one 
bearing the same level of liability. In this case the parent is liable for the actions of its 
subsidiary which loses its independence before the court. The problem is that the piercing of 
the veil is one of law’s most “unpredictable doctrines...predicting when the veil of limited 
liability will be disregarded is like predicting lightening strikes”95. This is because the lifting 
of the veil will be very much dependent on the nature of the case, the preferences of the 
individual judges96 who will be called up to issue a decision based on criteria which are 
anything but solid97. It is astonishing that even today the UK does not possess a “specific 
body of law applicable to corporate groups”98. The problem with the doctrine is its “raison 
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d’être”99. It exists as an exception to the rule of limited liability so as to prevent injustice and 
unfairness100. Therefore, the application of the doctrine has always been “fact specific and 
open-ended”101 or “incoherent and unpredictable”102, “uncertain and doctrinally 
unsustainable”103 or an “incomprehensible mess”104. 
The UK jurisprudence in this area is “far from principled”105. The courts are reluctant to 
admit the reality of interrelated companies acting in any other way than as a number of 
separate entities tied together by their relationship as significant shareholders in each other. It 
is not difficult to accept that perhaps the most “extreme example of separate units is the 
UK”.106The UK will employ a contractual approach towards the corporate group. It will view 
its constituent companies merely as shareholders who are pursuing their individual interests 
while protected by limited liability. Consistent to its laissez-faire economic principles the 
country refrained from putting in place any statute regulating liability at group level. The UK 
courts will consider the subsidiary as a single entity with the mother company only in cases 
of fraud or where it is shown beyond any possible doubt that the two companies constitute a 
single economic unit; that means that the subsidiary acts simply as the agent of the parent. 
These requirements have historically proved very hard to meet, as is shown by case law and 
legal practice. The approach of the UK courts is epitomised in the Adams107 case, where the 
Court of Appeal spelled out its position on the subject matter in the clearest terms: “if a 
company chooses to arrange the affairs of its group in such a way that the business carried on 
in a particular foreign country is the business of the subsidiary and not its own it is entitled to 
do so”. In the UK a 98% controlling interest of the parent in the subsidiary does not of itself 
give rise to an agency relationship so as to treat the parent and the subsidiary as one 
enterprise108. Therefore, so far as the English courts are concerned, there is no single group 
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`entity’ as such.109 In many ways globalisation poses such a challenge for the traditional legal 
system which is based on sovereign domestic legal systems. The activities of multi-national 
groups of companies point to the difficulty of holding them liable under “this traditional 
understanding of international law”110. International law is still focused on nation states as 
the main players111 therefore applying its jurisdiction to a group of companies will collide 
with national sovereignty. As explained before individual members of the group are subject 
to the jurisdiction of their establishment as the group does not possess a single legal 
personality and it does not amount to a single legal entity but to a collection of companies 
subject to divergent laws and legal norms.  
The main jurisdiction providing for avenues to link parents and subsidiaries using control 
mechanisms is Germany with the Konzenrecht112. A number of jurisdictions113 are using the 
German system and adding an ‘enterprise’ concept using a ‘control’ concept which links 
companies who are part of a company group together, often using connections which show 
that they are controlled by the same financial systems, overlapping managements or 
shareholders. The legal doctrine of the separation of the companies is breached in particular 
situations including the overlapping connections. In this way, the German law uses the  
relevant connections to say that some companies in the group will have legal obligations. 
However strong the connections between companies in the group they will not have 
obligations between companies unless they are linked by with an equity relationship i.e. a 
proportion of the same shareholders. This is not the same as the Albanian Law on 
Entrepreneurs and Companies114 because, although it which was modelled on the basis of the 
German law, it defines a parent-subsidiary ‘relationship’ which does not involve shareholder 
holding. Rather, the relationship ‘shall be deemed to exist where one company regularly 
behaves and acts subject to the directions or instructions of another company.’ The idea is 
that a claimant can sue the parent company or and subsidiaries wherever the company is 
incorporated. The ‘enterprise’ idea is not new115 but there is an invigorated push because of 
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moral outrage against tax avoidance by MNEs116. Recent scandals involving 
extraterritoriality arbitrage by MNEs have focused on tax avoidance and evasion.117 It is 
difficult to estimate the extent of the problem presented by tax havens because they operate 
as a ‘hidden economy’. However, Tax Justice and Oxfam have estimated that US$18.5 
trillions are processed in the havens, and that developing countries have lost US$12 trillions 
to illicit outflows.118 The company mechanisms of lifting the veil or a concept of enterprise 
groups are blunt tool and later we will consider other European initiatives. However, the 
company law mechanism of an ‘enterprise group’ is interesting, other initiatives found in this 
paper may be stronger.119   
 
 
Intellectual Property as a tool for tax avoidance 
In this context one needs to examine intellectual property as it “has become the leading tax-
avoidance vehicle”120 for multinationals. Multinationals are “stripping money out of market 
countries and into tax haven intangibles holding companies”121. Certain of the characteristics 
of intellectual property make it ideal for avoiding tax122. Firstly, in contrast to tangible 
property such as hardware or factories, intellectual property such as patents or copyright can 
easily be transferred to low tax countries or to tax havens with the click of a button or through 
the submission of paperwork123. Secondly, the nature of the intellectual right renders its 
precise market valuation very difficult to establish. That grants to multinationals the ability to 
justify the artificially low market valuations that entail low tax assessments. Virtually “all IP-
based tax-avoidance schemes involve assigning an artificially low price to a piece of IP”124 at 
some point in time. The most prevalent way to shift profits is therefore through transfer 
pricing and licensing. Transfer pricing is a business structural tool that helps multinationals to 
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manipulate the prices on intra-firm trade and the flow of services within the group to their 
own advantage125. When unrelated companies transact with each other the costs and prices of 
their financial exchange are driven and fixed by the market. This is not the case with 
multinationals and their intra-group exchanges. When members of the same group transact 
then the price of the transaction may not be fixed by the free market but by other 
considerations linked to minimising the groups’ costs and tax liability. The valuation of assets 
by mispricing assets including intellectual property assets exacerbates the first avoidance 
scheme where arbitrage is to transfer assets to a low-tax country126. Many MNEs establish a 
company in a low tax country -like Ireland for example- to which it licenses all patent rights. 
That allows all the future profits from the patents at international level to accrue to the Irish 
subsidiary, which is subject to a low taxation rate. Also, all the members of the group trading 
products and services under the brand name and the trademark transferred to the subsidiary 
will pay licensing fees to the member of the group established in the low tax country; those 
fees will be subject to low taxation. On top of that the licensing fees in question amount to 
costs that the other members of the group have to bear. Costs that could be deductible from 
their profits and significantly lower their taxability in their respective host countries too. At 
the same time the licensing fees are also subject to a low tax rate. A result of transfer pricing, 
the prices charged for intra-firm flows of goods, services, intangible property may differ 
significantly from those charged to independent companies for comparable goods or 
services127. This is why national law and international codes usually requires the parent 
company to receive what’s now called “arm’s length” royalties from its low-tax subsidiary 
for the use of the patents. The “arm’s length” standard which states that inter-unit 
transactions should be priced the same as the prices chosen by unrelated parties engaged in 
similar trades under similar circumstances128.However, the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations is quite hard to enforce due 
to the “lack of market parallels, multinationals’ use of tax heavens, and lack of disclosure of 
either earnings worldwide or of pricing methods”129.Of course the OECD Guidelines are just 
that it is a piece of soft law without any significant sanctions and the arm’s length price is not 
of a fixed value. It could be estimated on the basis of the price of similar products or services 
if traded between unrelated companies, but there is a high degree of uncertainty when 
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engaging in such price calculations. The fluidity in the outcome of such estimations renders 
the investigation of transfer pricing strategies difficult.  
The Case of Starbucks 
The case studies which are examined in this article demonstrate the significance of the 
problem. The three companies in question are all prominent and reputable corporations in 
their distinctive fields. Despite their high-profile corporate brand and international profile, the 
multinationals in question took advantage of their structures and shifted their profits among 
the members of the group in order to avoid tax. Company law provided them with the tools 
which enable tax avoidance. We argue that this should change. Between 2009-2013 Amazon, 
Google and Starbucks paid a combined total of £57,7 million despite revenues of nearly £32 
billion over the same period, meaning only 0.18% of revenues were paid in corporation 
tax130. The loss of significant tax revenue on the part of large corporate entities, which are 
producing great profits in the UK results in heftier tax bills for individuals and smaller 
companies fuelling resentment against the current economic model and subsequently the 
political arrangements which underpin it. The group is shifting profits from one jurisdiction 
to the other benefiting from the loopholes in national and international law to avoid paying 
appropriate tax to the various jurisdictions it is involved in. Taking into account that 60% of 
world trade takes place within multinational firms131, the extensive use of transfer pricing 
may be indicative of the potential tax losses for both developed and developing countries 
around the world. The House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs Report on 
“Tackling corporate tax avoidance”132 admits that the “UK faces a serious problem of 
avoidance of corporation tax especially by multinational companies even when they do large 
scale business in this country”. It identifies “transfer pricing” and the payment of 
“royalties”133 among the members of the group for the use of intellectual property rights and 
brands as two of the most effective means of lowering corporate tax bills. The Report stated 
the companies’ “assessments are based on accounts that defy economic and business 
realities” as they show profit being earned in low-tax jurisdictions in which “little or no real 
business takes place”134. The Report underlines the importance of tackling tax avoidance so 
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that the corporations pay their “fare share of tax”135.Zucman has calculated the total amount 
of wealth that is legally hidden as $7,6 trillion.136The problem is that it is law and to a great 
extent company law which provides the structures and the tools that enable tax avoidance. 
The 2013 OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting137accepts that these 
practices undermine the perceived integrity of “the tax system and may have a deleterious 
effect on tax compliance generally”138. This is an example of the philosophies examined at 
the beginning of this article. It undermines the fairness of national tax systems because 
taxpayers must bear a greater share of tax burden. American President F.D. Roosevelt noted 
that “taxes, after all, are the dues that we pay for the privileges of membership in an 
organised society”139. When some of the most powerful members of the society are not 
paying their feed then the entire society could face be destabilised.  
Starbucks which is a prominent multinational present in many wealthy high-tax countries in 
Europe as well as in North America did not have to pay any considerable tax in the UK140. 
While it maintains its physical presence through a chain of cafes in crowded high streets 
across the UK, it put its IP assets like “trademarks, proprietary roasting methods, and 
trademark-protected stored dress”141 into law tax jurisdictions. While Starbucks UK is the 
largest coffee chain in the UK, it has been reporting losses. This is because of transfer pricing 
within the group. It pays the parent company a royalty of 6% of sales for its use of 
intellectual property such as brand and business processes142.  Therefore, while Starbucks UK 
made a loss, overall the group made substantial profits partly due to the UK operations143. 
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Starbucks established a subsidiary in the Netherlands which was the only company 
responsible for its trade activities in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Starbucks 
Manufacturing BV which is a resident in the Netherlands is responsible for roasting the 
coffee beans which are used in the brand’s outlets in the aforementioned regions. The beans 
are bought by the Switzerland subsidiary of the group and then re-sold to the other members 
of the group. The costs for the cross-selling of beans are added to the royalty payments for 
the use of intellectual property. The tax ruling issued by the Dutch authorities in 2008 gave a 
selective advantage to Starbucks Manufacturing, which has unduly reduced its tax burden 
since 2008 by €20 - €30 million. In particular, the ruling artificially lowered taxes paid by 
Starbucks Manufacturing in two ways. Firstly, Starbucks Manufacturing paid a very 
substantial royalty to Alki which is a UK-based company in the Starbucks group for coffee-
roasting know-how. Since, the intellectual property rights of Starbucks are not located in the 
Netherlands, the royalties for them cannot be taxed in the Netherlands. That reduced the tax 
which was to be paid in the Netherlands. The Commission's investigation established that the 
royalty paid by Starbucks Manufacturing to Alki cannot be justified as it does not adequately 
reflect market value. In fact, only Starbucks Manufacturing is required to pay for using this 
know-how – no other Starbucks group company nor independent roasters to which roasting is 
outsourced are required to pay a royalty for using the same know-how in essentially the same 
situation. In the case of Starbucks Manufacturing, however, the existence and level of the 
royalty means that a large part of its taxable profits are unduly shifted to Alki, which is 
neither liable to pay corporate tax in the UK, nor in the Netherlands. 
Secondly, it paid an inflated price for green coffee beans to the Switzerland-based Starbucks 
Coffee Trading SARL144. In fact, the margin on the beans has more than tripled since 2011. 
Due to this high key cost factor in coffee roasting, Starbucks Manufacturing's coffee roasting 
activities alone would not actually generate sufficient profits to pay the royalty for coffee-
roasting know-how to Alki. The royalty therefore mainly shifts to Alki profits generated from 
sales of other products sold to the Starbucks outlets, such as tea, pastries and cups, which 
represent most of the turnover of Starbucks Manufacturing145.  
In 2008 it got a tax ruling from the Dutch tax authorities fixing “its remuneration as a mark 
up of 9-12% on a defined cost base”146. The Commission challenged the outcome of the 
Advanced Pricing Agreement between the Dutch Tax Authorities and Starbucks. It found that 
this “tax ruling issued by the respective national tax authority artificially lowered the tax paid 
by the company”147. The Commission concluded that, “the tax ruling endorsed artificial and 
complex methods to establish taxable profits for the companies. They do not reflect economic 
reality. This is done, in particular, by setting prices for goods and services sold between 
companies of the Starbucks group -so-called "transfer prices"- that do not correspond to 
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market conditions. As a result, most of the profits of Starbucks' coffee roasting company are 
shifted abroad, where they are also not taxed”148. Therefore, the Commission has ordered the 
Netherlands to recover the unpaid tax from Starbucks in order to remove the unfair 
competitive advantage they have enjoyed and to restore equal treatment with other companies 
in similar situations. The amounts to recover are €20 - €30 million. It also means that the 
companies can no longer continue to benefit from the advantageous tax treatment granted by 
these tax rulings. 
 
The Case of Google 
Google has been the centre of controversy too when using similar tax avoidance schemes. 
The House of Commons report on Google stated that “to avoid UK corporation tax, Google 
relies on the deeply unconvincing argument that its sales to UK clients take place in Ireland, 
despite clear evidence that the vast majority of sales activity takes place in the UK”149. The 
committee accepted that Google generated US $18 billion revenue from the UK between 
2006 and 2011. The company paid the equivalent of just US $16 million of UK corporation 
taxes in the same period. Google defends its tax position by claiming that its sales of 
advertising space to UK clients take place in Ireland. This was found to be deeply 
unconvincing on the basis of evidence that, despite sales being billed from Ireland, staff in 
the UK generated most of the sales revenue. It is quite clear that sales to UK clients were the 
primary purpose, responsibility and result of its UK operation, and that the processing of 
sales through Google Ireland has no purpose other than to avoid UK corporation tax. This 
elaborate corporate construct has damaged Google’s reputation in the UK and undermined 
confidence in the effectiveness of HMRC. Google also conceded that its engineers in the UK 
are contributing to product development and creating economic value in the UK150. Google’s 
tax avoidance scheme used the famous “double Irish Dutch sandwich”151. This is because the 
scheme152 involved two Irish affiliates and a Dutch shell company153. Google US moved part 
of it intellectual property namely its search and advertisement technologies to a subsidiary 
named Google Holdings. Google Holdings was incorporated in Ireland, but it is controlled 
and managed by another Google company in Bermuda. Therefore, as explained before it is 
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not a tax resident of Ireland. It is a tax resident of Bermuda. The transfer of intellectual 
property took place in 2003 before Google’s initial public offering. We do not know if the 
arm’s length rules were enforced as the purchase price is not public information154. Google’s 
market value increased greatly since its initial public offering therefore, the company was 
able to move its intangibles to its offshore subsidiary for what was a low price. The 
Irish/Bermuda hybrid then created yet another Irish subsidiary named “Ireland Limited,” to 
which it granted a license Google’s technologies. The new subsidiary licenses Google’s 
intellectual property to all Google affiliates in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Each one 
of the Google companies in these regions pays royalties to Ireland Limited to have the right 
to use the company’s intangibles including its technologies. Therefore, the bulk of Google’s 
non-US profits end up being taxable in Ireland only, where the corporate tax rate is 12.5%155. 
After that, Ireland Limited makes a royalty payment to the Bermuda subsidiary; namely to 
Google Holdings. The profits are therefore transferred from Ireland to Bermuda where the 
corporate tax is conveniently enough set at 0%. But, according to Irish tax law there is a tax 
which is to be imposed on royalty payments from the Irish to the Bermuda subsidiary. In 
order avoid this tax, “a detour by the Netherlands is necessary”156. Ireland Limited then pays 
royalties to the Dutch Google subsidiary –Google BV- a Dutch shell company. That payment 
is tax free since both countries are members of the EU. The Dutch shell then pays back 
everything to the Irish/Bermuda holding, but not it is tax-free because on the basis of Dutch 
tax law the holding is Irish, not Bermudian. 
Tricks on the Menu: A Double Irish, Dutch Sandwiches and the Case of Apple Inc 
One of the EU countries, which found itself in the centre of the controversy related to 
multinational, is Ireland. Ireland attracted massive investment due to its low 12.5% 
corporation tax rate but also due a variety of tax incentives such as the “double Irish”157. The 
“double Irish”158  tax formula that allows companies to escape tax by allocating intellectual 
property rights to the Irish subsidiary. Under Irish law companies are considered tax resident 
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if they are controlled or managed in Ireland159. Therefore, foreign companies incorporated in 
Ireland can escape Irish tax residency as long as they were managed and controlled by a 
company established in another country. Therefore, some companies are “tax resident in 
Ireland for some tax purposes, but are not tax resident for corporate tax payments”160.  
Apple established two subsidiaries in Ireland; namely Apple Operations Europe (AOE) and 
Apple Sales International (ASI). AOE provides services for Apple companies in Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa. ASI buys Apple brand products from manufacturers and sells them 
on to companies within the Apple group. They hold the right to use and sell Apple’s 
intellectual property outside America under a so-called cost-sharing agreement with Apple 
Inc. According to that, ASI has “economic rights to Apple’s intellectual property”161 outside 
the Americas; the legal ownership of intellectual property rests with Apple Inc. Under this 
agreement the two Irish subsidiaries made annual payments to Apple in the USA to fund 
research and development conducted on behalf of the Irish companies in the USA. These 
payments amounted to $2 billion in 2011 and then significantly increased in 2014162. These 
payments contributed to fund more than half of all research by the Apple group in the USA to 
develop its intellectual property worldwide163. According to the Irish law these expenses are 
deducted from the profits recorded by the Irish subsidiaries. ASI “enjoys the perfect 
complementary definition of corporate tax residence in Ireland and in the USA and it is not a 
tax resident of any country”164. This is because the definition of tax residence in Ireland 
appears to be the “perfect partner”165 for the USA. ASI is not a resident of Ireland, because its 
central management and control is in the USA. But, it is not a resident of the USA either 
because it is not incorporated in the USA166. Therefore, the two subsidiaries were “stateless 
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companies”167. As a result they were treated as a branch in Ireland and they were subject to 
tax only on the trading income attributable to that branch168. The Irish authorities agreed that 
the majority of ASI’s profits should be allocated to its head office. Only, this is a problem, 
because the head office, according to the Commission’s assessment, existed only on paper 
and could not have generated such sums. The head office was not based in any country and it 
did not have any employees or premises. The only recorded activities were occasional board 
meetings. At the time of the EU investigation in 2014, the head offices’ profits were not 
subject to any tax in any country under provisions of the Irish law that was no longer in 
force169. As a result of that although in 2011 ASI recorded a profit of 16 billion Euros only 50 
million of them were charged as tax in Ireland170. The greatest part of its profits was simply 
untaxed. The Commission opened investigations in 2014 regarding the allocation of profits 
between the two subsidiaries. The Commission found that the artificial allocation of profits 
was not reflective of the arm’s length principle and therefore they constituted unlawful state 
aid.171 A 1991 ruling by the Irish tax authorities “set its net profit at 12.5% of branch 
operating costs...and since 2007 its profits are deemed to be 8-18% of branch operating 
costs”172. The Commission found that the Irish tax authorities paid insufficient regard to the 
changing economic environment since 1991; the Irish authorities had substantially and 
artificially lowered the tax paid by Apple since 1991173. The tax ruling was renewed on very 
similar terms in 2007 and it was terminated in 2015. As a result of these rulings, Apple paid a 
tax rate of only 0,005% in 2014 on the profits of ASI down from an anyway low 1% in 
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2003174. Apple recorded in Ireland the entire set of profits made by sales of Apple products in 
the entire EU single market175. Apple used the low tax rates and IP transfer mispricing 
arbitrage scheme but they also used a contractual arrangement to avoid even more tax. Apple 
set up their sales operations in Europe in such a way so that customers were contractually 
buying products from ASI in Ireland rather than from the shops which sold those products to 
customers across the EU176. The Commission concluded that the Irish authorities had 
benefited Apple by ignoring the arm’s length principle and therefore ordered Ireland to 
recover 13 billion Euros of unlawful state aid plus interest between 2003 to 2014. Apple was 
illegally given a significant advantage over other businesses which were operating under the 
same national tax rules.  
The extension of the EU state aid rules to such cases is an important tool which aims at 
catching tax avoidance of such a scale. The state aid criteria in this case were all met. The 
1991 and 2007 rulings were issued by a state; Ireland. Ireland used state resources to provide 
an advantage to a private firm; namely the foregone potential tax revenues due to the 
corporate schemes in question. This policy obviously distorts competition and affects trade 
between member states as investment, which would otherwise, been diverted to other 
members of the union rested in Ireland due to the tax avoidance schemes. Apple and other 
multinationals were granted a selective advantage, which was not available to taxpayers in a 
similar or comparable situation. The arm’s length principle was clearly violated within the 
context of the intra-group transactions contributing to levels of tax that were simply 
unacceptable. That granted Apple a significant advantage in its competition to local firms 
which had to bear the regular tax burden provided for by law. Advance pricing agreements 
where transfer pricing is confirmed by tax authorities can constitute state aid on the basis of 
article 107TFEU since any “relief from tax is inevitably financed by the State or granted 
through State resources if they confer an economic advantage on a selective group of 
undertakings that distorts competition and affects trade”177. The use of the arm’s length 
principle by the Commission is an important element of its strategy against tax avoidance as 
it allows it to catch practices, which albeit in compliance with the local law, are in violation 
of the principle in question. Therefore, if the intra-group transactions are set at a price, which 
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is not reflective of their market value, the Commission can look at this case. This is because 
these transactions conceal a corporate strategy aiming at tax avoidance,. Although the arm’s 
length principle is not    well defined or pellucid, if it was not in place, then the case would 
have been dismissed as it did not violate the national law. The arm’s length principle is yet to 
be defined in its total precision however, the fluidity in setting all its parameters in detail 
allows the Commission to catch more cases on such a basis. As a concept it was formulated 
in Belgian Coordination178 cases, where the court held that a tax scheme which deviates from 
the general tax system confers an economic advantage if the tax base under that scheme is 
composed in such a way that it cannot resemble the tax base under the general scheme. 
Therefore, embarking from a vague basis the EU constructed the arm’s length principle in a 
flexible enough manner to catch corporate schemes, which lead to significant tax avoidance. 
This importance since on the basis of these seemingly lawful yet controversial to say at least 
tax schemes large multinational groups appear to have rendered the “payment of full or even 
reasonable taxes a relic of the past”179. 
The amount of unpaid taxes to be recovered by the Irish authorities would be reduced if other 
countries were to require Apple to pay more taxes on the profits recorded by Apple Sales 
International and Apple Operations Europe for this period in their jurisdictions. This is 
because the taxable profits of Apple Sales International in Ireland would be reduced if profits 
were recorded and taxed in other countries instead of being recorded in Ireland. The amount 
of unpaid taxes to be recovered by the Irish authorities would also be reduced if the US 
authorities were to require Apple to pay larger amounts of money to their US parent company 
for this period to finance research and development efforts180.  
Similarly in the USA, the Senate confirmed that, “sending valuable intellectual property 
rights offshore together with the profits that follow those rights is at the heart of Apple’s tax 
avoidance strategy”181. Apple Inc. has created three offshore corporations, entities that 
receive tens of billions of dollars in income, but which have no tax residence—not in Ireland, 
where they are incorporated, and not in the United States, where the Apple executives who 
run them are located. Apple has arranged matters so that it can claim that these ghost 
companies, for tax purposes, exist nowhere. One has paid no corporate income tax to any 
nation for the last 5 years; another pays tax to Ireland equivalent to a tiny fraction of 1 
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percent of its total income182. As we have seen, the European Commission stated that tax 
arrangements made by Ireland for Apple amounted to an unlawful state aid under the EU 
laand .in hearings before the United States Senate it was revealed that these “practices have 
allowed U.S.-based multinational corporations to amass an estimated $1.9 trillion in profits in 
offshore tax havens, shielded from U.S. taxes...there is a direct relationship between this 
rapidly accelerating shift of corporate profits offshore, on the one hand; and on the other, a 
worrisome Federal deficit fed in part by a decline in the contributions corporate taxes make to 
Federal revenue”183. 
 
It is time for change.  
The cases studies were indicative of the need to reform the law. Although, it is evident that 
corporate activities of this type lead to large-scale tax avoidance, it is also clear that the latter 
despite its clearly unethical nature is at the very end lawful. Tax avoidance at the group level 
is clearly linked to their ability to manipulate their institutional structures so as to shift profits 
from one member of the group to the other and perform transactions at artificially low prices. 
Tax avoidance is therefore clearly institutionalised. Company law allows practices which 
albeit morally questionable, economically detrimental and socially damaging they are at the 
end legitimate. Company law provides the MNEs with the legal tools to avoid paying tax, 
deprive public services from important sources of funding and fuel inequality which 
generates public discontent; the latter undermines the political system as it is normally 
channelled towards voting for extreme political forces with a populist agenda.  
Therefore, there is a need to change course and reform these aspects of company law that 
allow corporate groups to transfer profits among their members and escape taxation in 
potentially all the jurisdictions involved. It is clear that the issue extends further than shifting 
of profits to low tax jurisdictions such as Ireland. The law provides the groups with the ability 
to actually by-pass even the obligation to pay the minimum tax-rate which is set by Ireland by 
using the set of tricks which were explained in the relevant part of the article. The members 
of the EU are free to set any tax rate they perceive as appropriate for their economy; this is a 
matter of national sovereignty. So, the need for change of law and policy does not flow from 
the fact that the EU has members with different rates of taxation but that, corporate groups 
are allowed to avoid paying tax even in the low-tax EU members. Corporate groups by nature 
and by definition have a trans-national character since they are present in multiple 
jurisdictions and they can therefore exploit the legal loopholes inherent in a multiplicity of 
legal orders. Therefore, a trans-national solution should be sought. And while company law 
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remains national in the sense that it has not been harmonised at the EU level184, the principles 
of separate legal personality and limited liability constitute the fundamental features of 
company law in all member states of the EU. The article argues that they are indeed 
fundamental and they should be safeguarded at the level of the single company as they 
guarantee investment and legal certainty, but they should be revisited at the level of corporate 
groups in relation to their taxation. The case studies demonstrate that the two principles in 
question provide the groups with a controversial yet legal avenue through which they can 
avoid their tax obligations in a variety of jurisdictions. It is true that the EU has recently 
started to address this issue more seriously but the article argues that more radical reform is 
needed. 
A positive indication towards reform was signalled by the Cadbury Schweppes185case where 
thegroup –based in the UK- had established two subsidiaries in Ireland solely in order to 
benefit from the more favourable tax regime there. The issue here was whether a member 
state of the EU would be in a position to prevent companies established in its territory from 
availing themselves of a more favourable tax regime in another member state or whether this 
would be against the freedom of establishment which is one of the fundamental freedoms of 
the internal market. The British government argued that it was aiming at countering a specific 
type of tax avoidance involving the artificial transfer by a resident company of profits from 
the Member State in which they were made to a low-tax State by means of the establishment 
of a subsidiary in that State and the effecting of transactions intended primarily to make such 
a transfer to that subsidiary. The CJEU stated that a national measure restricting the freedom 
of establishment may be justified where it specifically relates to “wholly artificial 
arrangements” aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the Member State 
concerned. It follows that, in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be 
justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a 
restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements 
which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the taxnormally due on the 
profits generated by activities carried out on national territory186. This phrase “wholly 
artificial arrangements” could be an extremely important tool for combating aggressive tax 
avoidance in any national law. It provides a template to divide moral tax avoidance from 
immoral tax avoidance. This is a very complicated issue because many national laws include 
tax avoidance mechanisms as a way to incentivise savers but the difficulties are legion 
because finding the cut-off between moral tax avoidance and immoral schemes are inherently 
problematic. 187In Cadbury Schweppes case, the Court explained that practices such as 
arranging transfers of losses, within a group of companies, to companies established in the 
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Member States which apply the highest rates of taxation and in which the tax value of those 
losses is therefore the highest undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax 
jurisdiction in relation to the activities carried out in their territory and thus to jeopardise a 
balanced allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes188. These practices 
have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the profits generated by 
activities carried on in national territory. Therefore, if checking those factors leads to the 
finding that the subsidiary is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic 
activity in the territory of the host Member State, the creation of that subsidiary must be 
regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement.Therefore, article 
49TFEU on the freedom of establishment must be interpreted as precluding the inclusion in 
the tax base of a resident company established in a Member State of profits made by a 
subsidiary in another Member State, where those profits are subject in that State to a lower 
level of taxation than that applicable in the first State, unless such inclusion relates only to 
wholly artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally payable.  
If this principle is applied to the cases of Starbucks, Google and Apple it will lead to the 
spectacular increase of their taxable profits as the use of “artificial arrangements” and other 
legally-safe tricks has significantly decreased the tax they ought to pay. This also shows the 
difficulty in establishing a link between the parent and its subsidiary company. Should there 
is proof or indication that the subsidiary is not an establishment which participates in a stable 
and continuous basis in the economic life of a member state the veil, should be lifted and the 
profits of the subsidiary should be dealt with as the profits of the parent especially since they 
were generated in the jurisdiction where the parent is established. The legal privileges, which 
are absolutely essential for single companies, cannot be misused by groups to legally engage 
in tax avoidance.  
The case studies demonstrated the need to enforce a system where the profits generated by a 
company in a specific country should be taxed by that jurisdiction. When they are transferred 
around the members of the corporate group on the basis of artificial exchanges related to 
intellectual property rights or transactions in abuse of the arm’s length principle then at the 
very end the profits in question are not taxed in any jurisdiction including the low-tax one. In 
June 2017 the European Commission resurrected its plans for a so-called Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) which consists of two proposals one on 
Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and the other on Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB)189. Both proposals can pass only on the basis of unanimity. The CCTB 
will introduce new ways of calculating where a company actually makes its money. The 
formula looks at where the value is created, based on three equally weighted factors: assets, 
labour and sales. The CCCTBwould put a single member state in charge of collecting all 
European taxes due from a particular company. Those revenues would then be shared among 
the other member states according to where the profits were made. The EU would first have 
to agree upon the CCTB and then move on to the CCCTB.  
The package was proposed by the European Commission in 2011 as a single set of rules that 
cross-border companies could use to calculate their taxable profits in the EU, instead of 
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needing to deal with 28 different national systems; this is specific to calculating corporate 
groups’ profits rather than harmonising tax rates which falls within the member states’ 
national sovereignty. At that point, it was opposed by the UK and Ireland and it was shelved. 
With the departure of the UK from the EU, the EU re-launched the initiative in 2017. There 
is a focus now on companies paying taxes in the countries where economic activity takes 
place and profits are generatedvia an apportionment formula which is to be introduced 
through the new CCCTB proposal. The rules are aimed at ensuring that business profits are 
taxed in the jurisdiction where value is actually createdmaking it harder for multinationals to 
avoid tax by transferring intangibles such as brand or intellectual property to low-tax 
jurisdictions. The proposals include a number of anti-tax avoidance measures that are to be 
formulated and shaped on the basis of consultation between member states.  It would be 
compulsory for corporations with annual turnover of more than €750m which are tax-resident 
in an EU country. This is a very good starting point. It should however be complemented 
with what would be a major reform; that is the explicit removal of the corporate veil in cases 
where the profits generated by the mother company in its jurisdiction are transferred to its 
subsidiary which does not constitute an establishment which participates in a stable and 
continuous basis in the economic life of a member state on the basis of artificial 
arrangements. In this case the profits should be taxed by the jurisdiction of the mother in their 
entirety.  
 
Conclusion 
The article argued for the fair participation in the tax burden not only of individuals or small 
and medium sized companies, but also of larger companies and groups. Although the tax 
avoidance schemes were legal it is clear that government services are hit if the biggest 
companies do not pay tax. Groups, due to their structures and trans-jurisdictional nature can 
escape taxation in all jurisdictions involved. Groups can benefit from their jurisdictional 
arbitrage by using their institutional structures so as to shift profits from one member of the 
group to the other and perform transactions at artificially low prices. Therefore, it is clear that 
the so-called “organisational decoupling” of the group in different jurisdictions results in tax 
avoidance. Groups can attain significant tax avoidance using a web of intra-company loans, 
transfer agreements, intellectual property and other undoubtedly legal tools which can relieve 
the parent from many regulatory or tax burdens. The case studies which are examined in this 
article demonstrate the significance of the problem. The three companies in question are all 
prominent and ‘reputable’ corporations in their distinctive fields. Despite their high-profile 
corporate brand and international profile, the multinationals in question took advantage of 
their structures and shifted their profits among the members of the group in order to avoid 
tax. Company law provided them with the tools which enable tax avoidance. Therefore, there 
is a need to change course and reform these aspects of company law that allow corporate 
groups to transfer profits among their members and escape taxation in potentially all the 
jurisdictions involved. 
Corporate groups by nature and by definition have a trans-national character since they are 
present in multiple jurisdictions and they can therefore exploit the legal loopholes inherent in 
a multiplicity of legal orders. Therefore, a trans-national solution should be sought. And 
while company law remains national in the sense that it has not been significantly   
harmonised at the EU level, the principles of separate legal personality and limited liability 
constitute the fundamental features of company law in all member states of the EU. The 
article argues that they are indeed fundamental and they should be safeguarded at the level of 
the single company, but they should be revisited at the level of corporate groups in relation to 
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their taxation. The potential new EU developments and initiatives in this field are consistent 
with the main argument of this article which is that the law should be reformed so that it puts 
an end to the institutionalised tax avoidance on the part of corporate groups. The profits of 
the members of the group should be taxed by the jurisdiction where they are generated. Each 
member of the group should be viewed as established in the member state where it operates 
with its revenues shielded and -most importantly- taxed in that jurisdiction. When this proves 
to be too difficult or complicated, the corporate veil should be lifted altogether and the 
mother company of the group should be taxed for the entire set of profits made by all the 
members of the group in the EU. That would be a significant step towards creating a 
regulatory system that will ensure the fair participation of every individual and company in 
the tax burden.  
 
 
